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Abstract
In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting
￿rms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among
other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting
￿rms do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive.
This strategic e⁄ect is reversed and leads to a welfare level closer to the cooperative one and
strictly higher to that when permits are non-tradable. Allowing for market power in the permits
market, the incentive to under-regulate pollution re-appears regardless of whether permits are
tradable or not. With tradable permits, however, the incentive to under-regulate pollution
is comparatively weaker relative to the case of non-tradable permits. This entails potential
bene￿ts for the exporting ￿rms and countries since the prisoners￿dilemma is moderated.
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Recent negotiations among the major polluting countries concerning the restrictions of
greenhouse gas emissions, like CO2, surfaced the di¢ culty of ￿nding common cooper-
ative policies.1 This di¢ culty brought into light old concerns on the strategic use of
environmental policies, aiming towards enhancing the international competitiveness of
the exporting industries. Today it is common understanding that some developing coun-
tries, such as China and India, favor increased production at the cost of environmental
degradation consistently. However, this attitude is not a ￿ privilege￿of developing countries
only. For many decades the US and many western European countries, took advantage
of the lack of environmental regulation and developed cost-minimizing and production-
maximizing technologies without consideration of their environmental consequences (see
footnote 1).
The ￿ Strategic Environmental Policy￿or ￿ Ecological Dumping￿literature, mainly es-
tablished by Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1993), Conrad (1993), Rauscher (1994) and Ulph
(1996), has provided interesting theoretical research on this issue.2 A common sugges-
tion in this literature is that governments engaging in international competition have a
unilateral incentive to set the environmental regulation below the ￿rst best level when
their representative ￿rms compete a-l￿ Cournot in world commodity markets. The ra-
tionale is that laxer environmental regulation provides a credible commitment device to
the exporting ￿rms, which leads them to increase their outputs and gain market shares
from their rivals.3
Turning to a di⁄erent strand of the literature, Montgomery (1972) in his seminal work
1A recent example are the annual negotiations that took place in Bali in December 2007. Delegates
from 189 di⁄erent countries negotiated a new pact to succeed the Kyoto protocol. However, the US and
Australia refused to sign the pact claiming that the rati￿cation of the Kyoto protocol would unfairly
damage their energy-export based economies and cost jobs.
2Recent contributions to this literature e.g., Neary (2006), Simpson and Bradford (1996), Bayindir-
Upmann (2003), Greaker (2003) and Straume (2006) develop extensions and point out earlier limitations.
3Recent empirical ￿ndings by Levinson and Taylor (2008), Woods (2006), Ederington et al. (2005),
Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) and Ederington and Minier (2003) argue that indeed there is strategic
interaction in an environmental policy setting and that environmental policy can be used as a secondary
trade barrier.
1argued that under perfect competition in product and permits markets, the use of tradable
permits can lead to the cost minimizing solution and thus to greater welfare. Based on
this result, during the last two decades regulators have extended the use of tradable
permits. For instance, at the ￿rm level the European Union implemented a wide carbon
trading scheme since 2005 (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007), while in the US greenhouse gas
emissions have been regulated locally through regional carbon dioxide trading schemes
since 2001 (Rose et al., 2006). Both studies converge to the conclusion that overall
e¢ ciency of the system has improved after the introduction of tradable permits.
However, the policy implications of the use of tradable permits become less clear
when product or permit markets are not perfectly competitive. For example, the main
polluters seem to be the large chemical industries, characterized by large scale economies.
Sartzetakis (1997, 2004), von der Fehr (1993) and Ehrhart et al. (2008), among others,
provide examples where the existence of imperfect competition in the products markets,
result in lower welfare levels. This result is exacerbated when a single ￿rm can exert
market power in the permits market, e.g., Hahn (1984), or more signi￿cantly when market
power is determined endogenously and multilaterally, e.g., Malueg and Yates (2009) and
Lange (2008).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no attempt in the literature, to incorporate trad-
able permits in a model of strategic environmental policy. That is because eco-dumping
models imply that the governments decide unilaterally about the level of pollution al-
lowed. Therefore, questions such as the following, arise; why one country accepts pollution
from a rival one? Wouldn￿ t this create an incentive to issue a large number of permits
in each country leading to environmental degradation? If countries were to accept each
other￿ s allowances, what would restrict them from achieving a fully cooperative outcome
such that welfare is maximized? In this paper we address these questions and we sup-
port the necessity and the potential bene￿ts that may arise from the adoption of such a
system.
We develop a model of an international symmetric duopoly where each government
2decides unilaterally the level of regulation but the ￿rms are allowed to trade permits
in a competitive permits market. Our main result suggests that if both countries allow
trading of emission permits at the ￿rm level, the unilateral incentive of the governments
to set environmental policy insu¢ ciently lax is reversed. This result holds irrespective of
whether the model is symmetric or not and of the number of participants in the game.
The policy implication of this outcome is that, when governments bargain for setting
emissions caps, they are involved in a race to the top. This race to the top leads to
higher welfare in the exporting countries compared to the case of non-tradable permits,
and approaches the welfare of a cooperative solution game. The bene￿t of such a system
versus a cooperative solution is that the governments do not have an incentive to deviate
unilaterally from such a strategy. Thus, based on this result we conclude that countries
with similar characteristics that allow cross boundary trading of pollution permits, should
not worry about the welfare consequences of competition in environmental standards with
the rival countries. The welfare implications remain una⁄ected when the ￿rms exercise
market power in the permits market.
2 The model
We consider a symmetric two country, home and foreign, two stage game. Each country
is represented by an exporting ￿rm. In stage 1 the rival governments select the environ-
mental regulation level simultaneously so as to maximize welfare. Then in stage 2 the
￿rms compete a-l￿ Cournot in a world commodity market.4 In order to focus on strategic
trade issues we further assume that consumption of the goods in the two countries is
zero, thus total production by the two ￿rms is exported to the rest of the world (ROW).
Production for the domestic ￿rm is denoted by x, and the production cost is denoted
by c(x), where cx ￿ 0 and cxx ￿ 0 determine the marginal cost of production and the
4All choice variables and functions of the domestic (foreign) country and ￿rm are denoted by lower
case (upper case) letters. Since the two ￿rms (countries) in the main case are assumed symmetric, we
only present explicitly the variables and functions of the home ￿rm (country). Those of the foreign are
equivalently de￿ned.
3convexity of the cost function, respectively. Total revenues are r(x;X), and we assume
that the two outputs are substitutes, rX(x;X) < 0.
We assume that production is associated with a pollutant which a⁄ects the citizens in
both the exporting countries. Let denote e as the amount of pollution that the domestic
￿rm is allowed to emit, or equivalently the number of issued permits. The damage caused
from pollution in the domestic country is d(e + ￿E) where de, dE > 0, dee, deE, dEE ￿ 0
and ￿ 2 (0;1]. When ￿ = 1 the pollutant is perfectly transboundary and thus emissions
in the rival country a⁄ect equally the citizens in the home country, while in any other
case is partially transboundary.5
We further assume that each ￿rm has a private abatement technology available, a,
which allows adherence to the binding amount of permits issued by the governments. At
the same time the governments allow the ￿rms to trade permits. Each ￿rm can increase
(reduce) production above (below) e, if it buys (sells) pollution permits from the rival
one at a given price P " de￿ned by the governments. This ensures that the ￿rms are
price takers in the permits market, in other words the permits market is competitive.6
This is a simplifying assumption, yet at this point we aim to exploit the maximum of the
possible bene￿ts arising from the use of permits and thus we use this as an extreme or
a reference scenario. Later on in the analysis, we relax this assumption and we examine
how market power in the permits market weakens our results. If P " is su¢ ciently high
(low) it may be convenient for the ￿rm to sell (buy) an amount e > 0 (< 0) of its
initially allocated permits e which drives the ￿rm to reduce (increase) emissions by ￿e,
where ￿e ￿ e.7 Given the possibility of trading permits, abatement is assumed to be
5Cross-border pollution is modeled here as in Kennedy (1994). However, it can be modeled in various
ways di⁄erent from e + ￿E. An alternative way used in the relevant literature would be (1 ￿ ￿)e + ￿E
or more generally ￿1e + ￿2E. In such a case the results are not modi￿ed qualitatively.
6This implies that the permits price is exogenous for the ￿rms. This could be the case if the govern-
ments set the price at the world price level obtained from a global market of permits or any other price.
The assumption that the permits market may be competitive while the output market not it is common
in the relevant literature, e.g., Sartzetakis (1997, 2004).
7Note that e is multiplied by ￿ because one unit of pollution in the home country implies ￿ units of
pollution in the foreign country. A permit allowing one unit of pollution at home should allow ￿ extra
units to the foreign ￿rm when it is sold to the foreign ￿rm. In order to keep the sum of pollution in the
two countries constant after trade we multiply ￿e.
4a = f(￿x ￿ e + ￿e) ￿ 0 where ￿ is a positive scalar, fx > 0, fe < 0 and fe > 0. We
further assume a convex abatement cost function q(a), where qa(a) > 0 and q(a)aa > 0.
Given all the determinants of the pro￿t functions we de￿ne pro￿ts as:
￿ = r(x;X) ￿ c(x) ￿ q(a) + P
"e. (1)
In stage 2 of the game, given the amount of permits issued, the ￿rms maximize their
pro￿ts with respect to output and the number of permits they sell (buy) subject to the
constraint of abatement. Therefore, the ￿rst order conditions for the domestic and the
foreign ￿rms are: 8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
￿x = rx ￿ cx ￿ qx = 0
￿e = P " ￿ qe = 0
￿X = RX ￿ CX ￿ QX = 0
￿E = P " ￿ QE = 0
9
> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
. (2)
Second order conditions are satis￿ed since ￿xx < 0, ￿ee < 0 , ￿xx￿ee ￿ ￿2
xe > 0 and
￿XX < 0, ￿EE < 0 , ￿XX￿EE ￿ ￿2
XE > 0. Moreover, ￿xX < 0 and ￿xX < 0 ensure that
the output reaction functions are downward sloping. Stability in output competition and
uniqueness is implied by ￿xx￿XX ￿ ￿xX￿xX > 0.8 The last equilibrium determinant in
stage 2 is the equilibrium condition that clears the permits market:
e + E = 0: (3)
This equality simply states that the amount of permits that a ￿rm sells (buys) must
be bought (sold) by the rival, or equivalently, the total amount of permits issued by
the two governments equals the total number of permits used by the two ￿rms. The
permits market clearing condition (3) determines P ". Therefore, the scenario that we
follow allows the governments to issue unilaterally the number of permits they wish by
maximizing their own national welfare and then allow the ￿rms to trade permits at a
8For the uniqueness and local stability conditions in Cournot games see Dastidar (2000).
5given price.
2.1 Comparative statics
Here we examine the decisions made in stage 2 of the game and attain the comparative
statics. The analysis considers ￿rst the case of a fully symmetric international duopoly.
The results of this benchmark are then generalized in a case where various asymmetries,
e.g., di⁄erences in abatement cost and in pollution damage functions may exist between
the two countries. Further, they are extended to a more general case of a larger and
unequal number of countries and ￿rms.
In particular, we focus the comparative statics on the sign of the so called strategic
e⁄ect that appears in eco-dumping models and leads to the prisoners dilemma situation.
The strategic e⁄ect can be described as the e⁄ect that domestic environmental regulation
has on foreign output (which in turn a⁄ects domestic pro￿ts). Algebraically, in terms of
our modelling, it is denoted by @X￿
@e , where the asterisk denotes stage 2 equilibrium value.
Note that before proceeding to the analysis that the sign of this derivative in the relevant
literature is negative, i.e., @X￿
@e < 0.
2.1.1 Symmetric Case
Holding the assumption that everything in the model is fully symmetric we use a simpler,
than the traditional, way to obtain the sign of the partial derivatives. The following
proposition presents the sign of the strategic e⁄ect, @X￿
@e , in the strategic environmental
policy literature, and the signs of @e￿
@e and @e￿
@E which capture the way the domestic ￿rm￿ s
net supply of permits is altered when the domestic and foreign country￿ s endowments of
permits change:
Proposition 1:
(a) The strategic (regulation) e⁄ect appears to be positive and equal to the direct (regu-
lation) e⁄ect on foreign and domestic equilibrium output respectively, i.e., @X￿
@e = @x￿
@e > 0.
6(b)The e⁄ects of a change in the domestic and foreign endowments of permits over
the domestic permits net supply are @e￿
@e = ￿@e￿
@E = 1
2￿ > 0.
(See proof in the Appendix￿)
The important implication of Proposition 1 is that when the domestic government
changes the level of regulation, e, it will a⁄ect in the same way both the domestic and
foreign ￿rms￿outputs, i.e., dx￿
de = dX￿
de > 0. Hence, in our case, the strategic e⁄ect is
positive instead of negative as it is in models of the standard strategic environmental
policy literature, e.g., Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1993), Conrad (1993), Rauscher (1994)
and Ulph (1996). It follows that when regulation in the home country is relaxed, the
foreign ￿rm increases its output equally to the domestic ￿rm, while the pro￿ts of both
￿rms fall.
We now turn to explaining the driving forces of this result. The negative sign of
dX￿
de in the strategic environmental policy models when permits are non-tradable, is due
to the change in the marginal cost of abatement, which acts as a commitment device
against the rival ￿rm. That is, when the domestic government relaxes the emissions
standard then, for a given level of output, abatement carried out by the ￿rm is reduced.
This, in turn, reduces the marginal cost of abatement and thus the domestic ￿rm can
credibly increase output, while the foreign ￿rm decreases its output due to the negative
slope of the output reaction function. Under the assumption that ￿rms are allowed to
trade pollution permits, the aforementioned mechanism breaks down. In equilibrium any
increase in the number of permits by the regulator in the home or the foreign country
will a⁄ect both ￿rms￿marginal costs of abatement in the same way. That is, because
any change in the number of allowances a⁄ects the equilibrium permits price which is
common for both ￿rms. Hence, an increase in e reduces P " which implies lower marginal
costs of abatement for both ￿rms. As a result domestic and foreign output increase at the
same level. Indeed, as we show later in the analysis allowing trade of permits between the
two ￿rms eliminates the commitment mechanism available to the governments, although
in equilibrium no permits trade between ￿rms takes place!
7Part (b) of Proposition 1 determines the e⁄ect that a change in the number of permits
issued by a government has over the domestic (foreign) ￿rm￿ s equilibrium net supply of
permits. In particular, these e⁄ects are given as @e￿
@e = ￿@e￿
@E = 1
2￿. These results depend
crucially on part (a) of Proposition 1 which implies that equilibrium outputs will be the
same across ￿rms and the market clearing condition (3). In terms of our modelling these
partial e⁄ects can be interpreted as follows: When the domestic government decides to
issue a permit which allows an extra unit of emissions then the domestic ￿rm increases
(reduces) the number of permits sold to (purchased from) the rival by 1
2￿ units of emis-
sions. Hence, the rival is allowed to increase pollution by 1
2 units of emissions, since it
can only use a proportion ￿ of the permits bought. At the same time, pollution emitted
by the domestic ￿rm when a new permit is issued increases by 1
2 units of emissions. As
it can be seen in equation (A2) given in the Appendix, equilibrium supply of permits is
given from e￿ = ￿E￿ = e￿E
2￿ , thus ￿ a⁄ects the volume of traded permits. In case that
pollution is perfectly transboundary (￿ = 1) then if e 6= E the number of traded permits
is minimized, while when the pollutant tends to be purely local (￿ ! 0) then this number
becomes very large. More precisely, the number of traded permits is a decreasing function
of ￿. However, pollution in each country remains constant regardless of the level of ￿.
2.1.2 Asymmetric Cases-Extensions
It would be interesting to examine whether the previous results would hold if we relax
some assumptions or we allow for asymmetries between the two countries and ￿rms.
Speci￿cally, we may consider abatement cost or pollution damage functions across the
two countries. Moreover, extensions that would simulate more realistic examples would
be the existence of a larger number of ￿rms and/or countries. Without loss of generality
the previous analytical setting can accommodate such extensions and can replicate the
major result so far. That is, in the case of tradable permits, the strategic e⁄ect has a
positive sign. The following proposition brings into line these suggestions:
Proposition 2:
8(a) In case where the abatement cost and of pollution damage functions di⁄er across
￿rms and countries, then the strategic e⁄ect has a positive sign, i.e., @X￿
@e > 0.
(b) If we assume n > 2 countries, m > 2 ￿rms competing in the global market, where
at least one ￿rm is located in each country, then under symmetry of all other things, the
strategic e⁄ect has a positive sign, i.e., @xi￿
@et = @xj￿
@et > 0.
(See proof in the Appendix￿)
Proposition 2 is a generalization of Proposition 1. It simply states that if we allow
for di⁄erent abatement cost functions among ￿rms, di⁄erent assimilative capacities of
the environments in the two countries, i.e., the damages caused from the same pollutant
in the two countries di⁄er, if the number of countries and ￿rms is higher than two,
the basic implication remains una⁄ected. The strategic e⁄ect remains positive. Put it
di⁄erently, when the governments decide about the optimal number of permits, they
face an additional disincentive to issue additional permits. This in turn has signi￿cant
implications in terms of welfare as we will show later on in the analysis.
The driving forces of this result follow those of Proposition 1. In brief, the common
permits price faced by the ￿rms equalizes the marginal costs of abatement across ￿rms.
Given this, the problem reduces to a simple Cournot game with symmetric ￿rms, implying
equal equilibrium output levels by the ￿rms in stage 2. Any parametric change, e.g.,
changes in the number of permits in one country, leads to a new equilibrium where outputs
are still equal. Further extensions beyond Proposition 2 may be examined. However,
introducing several asymmetries such as di⁄erences in abatement technologies require for
a more elaborated analysis. The existence of di⁄erent abatement technologies in the two
countries, i.e., di⁄erent ￿￿ s, breaks down the symmetry argument presented so far. Once
more the permits price is common for the ￿rms, implying that changes in the endowments
of permits in one country a⁄ect the permits price equally. Yet, this is not su¢ cient to
yield qx(￿) = QX(￿), which in turn implies that equilibrium outputs in stage 2 di⁄er. Both,
qx(￿) and QX(￿), fall when the number of permits increases by one government, but not at
the same level. As a result the output reaction function shift outwards asymmetrically.
9Whether both equilibrium outputs increase or not, depends on the level of the change in
the number of permits and on the slopes of the reaction functions. Nonetheless, the most
likely scenario suggests that the strategic e⁄ect maintains its positive sign.
3 Welfare E⁄ects
In this section we examine the welfare e⁄ects of environmental regulation, i.e., of pollution
permits, by the two rival governments. In the analysis we retain the assumption of
a perfectly symmetric international duopoly model. Before, however, proceeding to the
welfare e⁄ects of our analysis, it is enlightening to introduce the welfare e⁄ects of two polar
cases and see where does our scenario lie. The two polar cases are: ￿rst, the cooperative
equilibrium where the two governments commonly decide the level of pollution and then
distribute permits to the ￿rms and, second, the Nash equilibrium where each government
unilaterally decides on the level of regulation without allowing trading of permits between
the ￿rms. For clarity, we will denote our case as a "semi-cooperative" equilibrium since
the governments issue permits unilaterally but allow a cross border trading of permits
between ￿rms.
3.1 The Cooperative Equilibrium
Given that the two exporting countries are not consumers of the exporting good, the
consumers surplus is captured exclusively by the changes in the damage function in the
welfare analysis. Welfare in the home is determined as follows:
w = ￿ ￿ d(e + ￿E). (4)
In the cooperative solution we assume that the governments agree prior to stage 1 to
maximize the joint welfare, i.e., w+W. In stage 1 of the game the governments maximize
w+W with respect to the number of issued permits in each of the two countries. Permits
are then distributed to the ￿rms. In this way, we derive two ￿rst order conditions, one
10with respect to e and one with respect to E. However, it is straightforward that e and
E are linearly dependent. In other words, the governments can determine a speci￿c
level of pollution that they are willing to accept and then distribute the total number of
permits to the two ￿rms. Since the model is fully symmetric we assume that the total
number of permits is equally distributed between their two exporting ￿rms. The ￿rst
order conditions for the sum of welfare levels in the two countries are the following:9
d(w + W)
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and
e
￿ = E
￿
(6)
The asterisks denote equilibrium values and below each term we indicate the partial
e⁄ect of e on the corresponding variables and its sign. The ￿rst two terms in (5) are zero
by the ￿rm￿ s maximization problem. We call the third term "general strategic e⁄ect" and
it corresponds to the strategic e⁄ect introduced in the previous section, @X￿
@e , multiplied
9The second order conditons of the problem are satis￿ed since the problem is concave.
11by @￿￿
@X￿. The overall sign of this term is negative and compels the regulator towards a
tighter standard. This term in a Barrett (1994) setting appears to be positive, in which
case each regulator is forced to unilaterally set laxer standards, thus leading ￿rms towards
a race to the bottom. The next term, with a positive sign, represents the direct bene￿t
from relaxing regulation, since the higher the standard is, the lower is the marginal cost
of abatement. However, this comes at the cost of environmental deterioration represented
by the sixth term. The permits price e⁄ect is ambiguous. In case the domestic ￿rm is a
permits seller (buyer) then the sign will be negative (positive) as @￿￿
@P"￿ = e￿. The partial
e⁄ects for the foreign country follow similarly.
Using the properties of the model and the results so far, e.g., the permits price e⁄ects
cancel out since they have an opposite sign, @X￿
@e = @x￿
@e > 0 by Proposition 1 and @￿￿
@X￿ =
@￿￿
@x￿ due to symmetry, equation (5) is simpli￿ed to:
d(w + W)
de
= 2
@￿￿
@X￿
@X￿
@e
+
@￿￿
@e
￿
@d
@e
￿
@D
@e
= 0. (7)
Equation (7) determines the level of permits issued in the domestic country such that
the sum of the two countries welfare is maximized. It can be shown that the cooperative
scenario that we propose is not restricting in the sense that it can be modi￿ed and yield
the same outcome. In particular, even if trade of permits is not allowed between ￿rms
the cooperative solution in equilibrium yields the same level of regulation and thus the
same welfare level.10
3.2 The Nash Equilibrium
We now introduce the second polar case, where both governments set environmental
standards unilaterally without allowing ￿rms to exchange permits. This is the core of
the eco-dumping models presented above. In order to adjust our analytical speci￿cation
to these models, we assume that ￿rms cannot trade permits in stage 2, i.e., e = E = 0.
10The proof can be provided upon request by the authors.
12Thus, ￿rms maximize their pro￿ts only with respect to their outputs. A well established
result from the strategic environmental policy literature is that @X￿
@e < 0.11 Therefore,
the welfare maximizing conditions are the following:
dw
de
=
@￿￿
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@x￿
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+
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+
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(+)
= 0 (8)
for the domestic government and due to symmetry, for the foreign government it is implied
by equation (6).
Comparing the permits reaction functions of the domestic government in the two
polar cases given by equations (7) and (8), we observe that in the Nash equilibrium there
is a bias in favor of laxer regulation (higher e), since contrary to the cooperative case,
the general strategic e⁄ect is now positive forcing the governments to relax further the
regulation level. At the same time, when governments set their standards unilaterally
they do not take into account the externality caused from their own ￿rms￿emissions to
the rival country strengthening this outcome. As a result a race to the bottom occurs
in environmental policy setting among the rival governments, which lowers welfare in
comparison to the cooperative case.
Another important implication is that even if we assume that in the Nash case gov-
11In order to determine this sign we can di⁄erentiate the pro￿t maximizing conditions of the ￿rms
with respect to outputs and solve for the comparative statics:
￿
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#
:
Given the signs of the second partial derivatives of pro￿ts we obtain that dx
￿
de > 0 and dX
￿
de < 0.
13ernments do not act strategically,12 i.e., environmental regulation is set at the Pigouvian
level, regulation will be laxer than the one in the cooperative scenario, resulting to lower
welfare levels in both the exporting countries.
3.3 The Semi-Cooperative Equilibrium
Now we analyze the welfare e⁄ects of issuing pollution permits in the case of the "semi-
cooperative" equilibrium, whereby the governments select unilaterally the level of regu-
lation but then the ￿rms are allowed to exchange pollution permits at a given price. The
welfare maximizing conditions are the following:
dw
de
=
@￿￿
@x￿
@x￿
@e
+
@￿￿
@e￿
@e￿
@e | {z }
zero (F.O.Cs)
+
@￿￿
@X￿
@X￿
@e | {z }
general
strat. e⁄.
(-)
+
@￿￿
@e |{z}
relaxing
regul bene￿t
(+)
+
@￿￿
@P "￿
@P "￿
@e | {z }
permits price
e⁄ect
(ambiguous sign)
￿
@d
@e |{z}
regul.
bene￿t
(+)
= 0 . (9)
and the one given in equation (6) due to symmetry.
Note that since e￿ = E
￿
, then by using equation (A2) in the Appendix e￿ = ￿E￿ =
e￿E
2￿ = 0. In this case the permits price e⁄ect, i.e., the term @￿￿
@P"￿
@P"￿
@e (= e￿ @P"￿
@e ) is zero.
Hence, the equation (9) can be rewritten as follows:
dw
de
=
@￿￿
@X￿
@X￿
@e
+
@￿￿
@e
￿
@d
@e
= 0. (10)
12This term is attributed to Uplh (1996) and implies that the governments set the general strategic
e⁄ect equal to zero when they maximize welfare.
14Comparing the modi￿ed equation (10) to (8) we observe that in the former there is
a bias towards tighter regulation because the general strategic e⁄ect has a negative sign.
This implies that in the semi-cooperative equilibrium regulation will be tighter and thus
pollution in the two countries will be lower. A double bene￿t appears in this case. On the
one hand, environmental degradation is dampened due to stricter regulation, and on the
other hand, the two ￿rms coordinate and produce lower output increasing so the market
price and thus increasing their pro￿ts. This result remains una⁄ected even if we assume
that at Nash the governments act non-strategically, in which case the strategic e⁄ect is
zero.
Comparing the modi￿ed equation (10) to (7) we directly observe that in the latter
case regulation is tighter. The reason is twofold: ￿rst that the general strategic e⁄ect
in the cooperative equilibrium is twice as strong as in the case of the semi-cooperative
equilibrium. Second in the cooperative case the governments take into account the cross
border externality caused from pollution.
The following proposition summarizes the ranking of the three pollution equilibria
and equilibrium welfare levels:
Proposition 3: The ranking of equilibrium pollution and welfare levels in the three di⁄er-
ent scenarios is: e￿
Cooperative < e￿
Semi￿cooperative < e￿
Nash and w￿
Cooperative > w￿
Semi￿cooperative >
w￿
Nash.
Intuitively, in the cooperative equilibrium we maximize w + W. Therefore, the do-
mestic country￿ s welfare equals (w￿+W￿
2 )Cooperative when e￿ = E
￿
. Since in the other
two equilibria e￿ is higher and welfare is a concave function of regulation, then regu-
lation is set above the optimal level. This implies that w + W is lower and in turn
w￿
Semi￿cooperative = (w￿+W￿
2 )Semi￿cooperative > w￿
Nash = (w￿+W￿
2 )Nash.
The ranking of welfare is an important feature proposed in this study. It simply states
that a Pareto superior outcome in terms of welfare can be achieved if the governments
act unilaterally but allow cross border trading of permits between the ￿rms compared to
15the case where they do not. Naturally, a question that arises from the analysis is that
since the governments can agree to accept trade of permits, why don￿ t they agree to a
cooperative solution which maximizes their joint welfare? The answer to it is based on
the sustainability issue. On the one hand, in the cooperative game, there is always an
incentive for the governments to break up the agreement. Each government knows that
in the cooperative equilibrium it can bene￿t if it deviates unilaterally so that its own ￿rm
gains a greater market share. This outcome becomes likelier as the coalition consists of
a large number of participants.
On the other hand, the semi-cooperative equilibrium is sustainable. Both governments
do not have an incentive to deviate unilaterally from the equilibrium level. If we assume
that there exists a pre-stage level where the governments decide whether or not to accept
permits issued in the rival country, then it can be shown that it is a dominant strategy
to accept permits issued in the rival country regardless of what that country does. If,
hypothetically, the foreign country announces that permits issued in the home country are
not accepted, the home country should still accept permits from abroad. To understand
this we should once more focus on stage 1 of the game where the level of regulation is
determined. From equation (A2) we know that the domestic ￿rm buys permits from its
foreign counterpart only if e < E. The governments anticipate this in stage 1. So, they
assign a positive probability to that the domestic ￿rm will buy permits from the foreign
one when they select the level of regulation, because each government does not observe
the rival￿ s choice. Hence, the objective welfare functions for the domestic and the foreign
governments will be consisted by a weighted sum of the welfare functions in the two cases
(semi-cooperative and Nash). As a result the domestic government will achieve higher
welfare as regulation will be tighter in both countries. The mechanism proposed in this
paper continue to apply, though a bit moderated.
What the paper neglected so far are the welfare e⁄ects in ROW and hence, in global
welfare. If ROW is negatively a⁄ected from the pollution caused in the two exporting
countries then by all means ROW is bene￿ted when the exporting countries allow the
16trade of permits. Yet, this does not mean that the citizens will be better o⁄. Since the
citizens in ROW are the consumers of the product, they will be damaged when permits
are tradable as the price will be higher. Which of the two e⁄ects will prevail is uncertain
and depends on the selected functions. If the pollutant is very injurious then welfare
in ROW will be higher in the semi-cooperative than the Nash scenario and the reverse.
Using a similar rationale global welfare implications follow.
4 The Role of Market Power
To this point we assumed a competitive permits market where for a given market clearing
price P ", ￿rms in stage 2 of the game decide, among other things, on the number of
permits to trade, i.e., to buy from (sell to) the rival. Here on this assumption is relaxed.
In particular, we consider the case whereby ￿rms can in￿ uence the permits price when
they select their desired number of permits to trade. If so, then in stage 2 of the game,
￿rms no longer are price takers in the permits market. This non-competitive speci￿cation,
however, creates analytical complexities which a⁄ect the clarity of the results. For this we
adopt speci￿c linear functional forms already used in the relevant literature to facilitate
the analysis. Thus, we assume that the inverse demand function of the consumers in the
third country is P(x;X) = B ￿ x ￿ X, where B is the demand intercept. The inverse
demand function implies that the good is homogenous (x and X are perfect substitutes).
In the same spirit we assume that ￿, ￿ = 1, c(x) = cx, q(a) = 1
2ga2 and that the damage
from pollution is represented by d(e+E) = 1
2k(e+E)2. Moreover, k, g and c are positive
scalars. In the Appendix of the paper we set out the competitive, non-market power,
solution of the linear speci￿cation, to which we compare the results of the market power
scenario.
The assumption ￿rms possessing market power in the permits market, implies that the
￿rms do not know how their decision regarding the supply of permits a⁄ects the demand
function of the rival and the price of permits. To facilitate the analysis we introduce
17the "implicit" demand functions for permits. The use of this term refers to the marginal
utility obtained by each ￿rm from buying one permit. Here, the marginal utility of every
additional permit equals to the reduction of the marginal cost of abatement. Hence, the
implicit demand for permits for the domestic ￿rm is P " = g(x ￿ e + e). The sign in
front of e is positive. Recalling that when e < 0 the ￿rm demands permits it follows
that the demand function has a negative sign. Given this, the derivatives @P"
@e , @P"
@E = g
are calculated by the ￿rms when they select the supply of permits. The maximization
problem that the ￿rm faces is:13
max
x;P" ￿ (11)
subject to e + E = 0.
The ￿rst order conditions with respect to output remain unchanged. Substituting the
constraint into the objective function and di⁄erentiating with respect to x and P " we
obtain the ￿rst order conditions for the domestic ￿rm:
8
> <
> :
d￿
dx = B ￿ c ￿ 2x ￿ X ￿ g(x ￿ e + e) = 0
d￿
dP" = ￿E ￿ @E
@P"P " ￿ g(x ￿ e ￿ E) @E
@P" = ￿E ￿ P"
g + (x ￿ e ￿ E) = 0
9
> =
> ;
. (12)
where @E
@P" = 1
g. Solving simultaneously (12) with the corresponding foreign ones and using
the equilibrium condition for the permits market given by (3) we obtain the equilibrium
outputs, supply of permits and permits price, as a function of the domestic and foreign
number of permits issued by the governments:
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
x￿￿ =
2(2+g)(B￿c)+g[(5+2g)e￿E]
2(3+g)(2+g)
X￿￿ =
2(2+g)(B￿c)+g[(5+2g)E￿e]
2(3+g)(2+g)
e￿￿ = ￿E￿￿ =
(e￿E)
2(2+g)
P "￿￿ =
g[2(B￿c)￿3(e+E)]
2(3+g)
9
> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
. (13)
13This methodology was ￿rst introduced by Hahn (1984) to model a permits market where a single
￿rm possesses market power.
18Comparing the stage 2 equilibrium values in (13) to those in (A4) given in the Ap-
pendix, i.e., the market power versus non-market power, yields an important result. The
equilibrium values of permits supply (demand) are lower than in the case where the ￿rms
possess market power. This is due to the fact that @E
@P" = 1
g > 0. This denotes the market
power of the domestic ￿rm and implies that a possible increase in the permits price P "
lowers the foreign demand for permits. This reduces the amount of permits sold, while
the opposite holds in case the domestic ￿rm is an importer of permits. On the one hand
the higher price yields higher pro￿ts, while on the other hand, a higher price implies lower
exports which reduces the revenues. Hence, these two opposing forces must be balanced
by the ￿rms. As a result, the supply of permits is reduced so that the domestic ￿rm
exercises its market power over the foreign ￿rm￿ s demand and vice-versa.
In the case of non-market power (directly follows from Proposition 1) the derivative of
the supply of permits e with respect to the number of permits issued by the governments
e and E is de￿
de = 1
2 and de￿
dE = 1
2, respectively. These results imply that for every permit
issued, half of it is sold to the rival ￿rm. Hence, we concluded that relaxing regulation
would a⁄ect both ￿rms￿marginal cost of abatement equally, eliminating the incentive for
the strategic use of regulation. Allowing ￿rms to exercise market power in the permits
market the corresponding derivatives become de￿￿
de = 1
2(2+g) > 0 and de￿￿
dE = ￿ 1
2(2+g) < 0,
which are smaller in absolute terms than 1
2. This implies that an increase in e will create
an incentive to the domestic ￿rm to sell a proportion of these permits, yet this propor-
tion is lower than half of the quantity issued. This is in line with the results proposed by
Malueg and Yates (2009) and Lange (2008) who illustrated that a multilateral oligopoly
in the permits markets restricts the volume of trade and leads to an ine¢ cient outcome.14
In other words, the marginal costs of abatement, are now a⁄ected asymmetrically when
the endowments of allowances change in the two countries. For every additional permit
issued by a government the ￿rm uses a proportion above 50% for increasing production
14In these studies the authors introduce supply function equilibria to deal with the issue of market
power of ￿rms in permits markets.
19and the rest for selling its allowances to the rival ￿rm, which in turn can increase its own
production. Since the derivative is lower than half, when the domestic (foreign) govern-
ment relaxes regulation for the ￿rm located in that country, it decreases the marginal
cost of abatement for both ￿rms. The decrease for the ￿rm that is located in this country,
is greater in absolute terms than the one of the rival. As a result, two opposing forces
appear concerning the output of the rival ￿rm. First, a lower marginal cost of abatement
implies higher output. Second, the reduction in marginal cost of abatement appears to be
greater for the domestic ￿rm and thus domestic output increases more than the foreign
one. Consequently, a negative e⁄ect appears on the foreign output through the reaction
function of output which is negatively sloped. The net e⁄ect is negative as suggested
by the derivative dX￿￿
de = ￿
g
(2+g)(3+g) < 0, obtained after di⁄erentiating foreign output in
(13) with respect to the amount of permits issued in the home country. This is due to
the fact that the second e⁄ect prevails to the ￿rst one.
A direct implication carried out from the aforementioned analysis is that the strategic
e⁄ect is negative which implies that the governments have the incentive to relax the reg-
ulation level below the ￿rst best (Pigouvian) level. However, this incentive is aggravated
when permits are non-tradable (i.e., they take the form of a binding emission standard
for the ￿rm). The implications concerning welfare are signi￿cant since the intensity of the
prisoners dilemma in the governments game, when permits are tradable, is mitigated such
that it leads to increased welfare levels in both countries, compared to the non-tradable
permits scenario. This, as well as, a welfare ranking across the polar cases are provided
explicitly in the following proposition:
Proposition 4:
(a) Welfare with market power < Welfare with no market power.
(b) Allowing for market power in the permits market, Proposition 3 is replicated.
(See proof in the Appendix￿)
The main implication re￿ ected by Proposition 4 is that the welfare ranking within
the di⁄erent scenarios is not a⁄ected by the introduction of market power in the permits
20market. We do, however, understand that if the permits price is not set exogenously to
the ￿rms, the e¢ ciency of the semi-cooperative scenario is reduced. The driving force of
this outcome is that the sign of the strategic e⁄ect is reversed. Despite this outcome, the
semi-cooperative scenario still yields a Pareto superior outcome both in terms of pollution
and welfare compared to the case suggested in the eco-dumping models. As a result, all
the bene￿ts and possible implications of such a scenario continue to apply.
5 Conclusion
Our aim in this paper was to investigate if and how, the introduction of tradable permits in
a model of strategic environmental policy could alter the standard result in the literature,
namely: in an oligopolistic international market structure with ￿rms competing a-l￿
Cournot, each government engaging in international competition has a unilateral incentive
to set the environmental policy level below the ￿rst best. We show that in the case where
the ￿rms do not have market power in the permits market, allowing them to exchange
permits, reverses the sign of the strategic e⁄ect from negative (in the case of non-tradable
permits) to positive although in equilibrium no trade of permits takes place!
This indicates a reversal of the incentives of the involved governments towards not
fully internalizing the externality caused from pollution. In our model, both governments
appear to be unwilling to assist the rival ￿rm to increase output through lowering the mar-
ginal cost of abatement ensured by the possibility of buying permits. This implies that
both governments are negative towards selecting lax regulation levels, over-internalizing
pollution. The introduction of tradable permits can be viewed alternatively as the intro-
duction by the governments of a more complex strategy. Such a strategy suggests that
the choice of the optimal level of regulation in each country should be a function of the
choice of the rival government. When, for instance, e > E then the domestic government
allows the domestic ￿rm to increase pollution above the binding level of e by e￿E
2￿ and the
reverse. This alternative scenario yields the same properties as the "semi-cooperative"
21one suggested in this study when the permits market is competitive.
What are the implications of this result? The appearance of a disincentive to relax
the country-speci￿c environmental policy, leads governments towards tightening their
standards. Hence, the prisoners dilemma at the government level is reversed, which
results in higher welfare levels in both exporting countries compared to the case where
the governments do not allow the ￿rms to exchange permits. However, equilibrium welfare
remains lower than the corresponding cooperative one. These results are still valid when
￿rms exercise market power in the permits market. The introduction of market power
causes welfare losses without altering the welfare ranking between the three scenarios.
The main bene￿t of the alternative scenario suggested in this paper, i.e., choosing the
number of permits unilaterally but allowing ￿rms exchanging them, is that it is feasible.
Put it di⁄erently, the governments would not have an incentive to deviate from this
strategy.
Possible extensions of our model could concern the welfare e⁄ects after the introduc-
tion of moderations or asymmetries in the model as suggested in section 2. If we allow for
a larger number of players (￿rms and governments) in the game our welfare implications
remain robust. Yet, allowing several asymmetries, as for instance, that the two countries
have di⁄erent scalars determining the marginal cost of abatement or marginal damage
functions a more elaborated analysis is demanded and it is left for future research. In
particular, the welfare e⁄ects are uncertain. If the range of these asymmetries is insignif-
icant or rather small, we expect our main results to hold. If not, then possibly one of the
two countries will be harmed a⁄ecting so the sustainability issue.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
(a) We use the ￿rst order conditions of (2) and (3) to solve the game in stage 2. Note
that qx = ￿qa and qe = ￿qa. After some simple rearrangements we have qx = ￿
￿qe. Using
22the second equation in (2) gives P " = qe. Now ￿x = 0 and ￿X = 0 can be rewritten as:
8
> <
> :
￿x = rx ￿ cx ￿ ￿
￿P " = 0
￿X = RX ￿ CX ￿ ￿
￿P " = 0
9
> =
> ;
(A1)
We observe that the term ￿
￿P " is common for both ￿rms. Since the problem is symmetric
we can solve the two ￿rst order conditions, ￿x = 0 and ￿X = 0, separately from the rest
and we obtain that in stage 2 equilibrium outputs are equal, i.e., x￿ = X￿. Having that
P " is common for both ￿rms )
@qx
@e = ￿
￿
@P"
@e =
@QX
@e < 0. Hence, ceteris paribus a change
in the domestic level of regulation a⁄ects equally the domestic and foreign marginal cost
of abatement which implies @x￿
@e = @X￿
@e > 0 Q.E.D.
(b) Since P " is common for both ￿rms, from the other set of equations in (2), ￿e = 0
and ￿E = 0, is implied that abatement cost functions are the same across ￿rms ) qe =
QE , ￿x￿e+￿e = ￿X ￿E+￿E. Recalling that x￿ = X￿ and using the market clearing
condition (3) we obtain:
e
￿ = ￿E
￿ =
e ￿ E
2￿
. (A2)
Di⁄erentiating (A1) we get @e￿
@e = ￿@e￿
@E = 1
2￿ > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
(a) If abatement cost functions are di⁄erent across ￿rms and everything else is sym-
metric ) q(￿) 6= Q(￿). From (2) it follows that P " = qe = QE which implies that the
pro￿t maximizing conditions with respect to output are the same as in (A1). Since every-
thing else is symmetric it follows that equilibrium outputs in stage 2 are equal. Using
@qx
@e =
@QX
@e = ￿
￿
@P"
@e < 0 ) @x￿
@e = @X￿
@e > 0 Q.E.D.
The fact that the damage functions are di⁄erent across countries, i.e., d(￿) 6= D(￿)
should not a⁄ect ￿rms￿￿rst order conditions in stage 2 since the damage functions do
not appear in the ￿rms￿objective functions. Hence, Proposition￿ s 1 implications remain
unchanged Q.E.D.
23(b) Firms￿￿rst order conditions are in total 2 ￿ m and are given by:
8
> <
> :
￿i
x = ri
x ￿ ci
x ￿ qi
x = 0
￿i
e = P " ￿ qi
e = 0
9
> =
> ;
; (A3)
where i describes a random ￿rm, i.e., i = 1;2;:::;m. From the second equation in (A3)
we obtain that P " = q1
e = ::: = qi
e = ::: = qm
e . Using that qi
x = ￿qi
a and qi
e = ￿qi
a )
qi
x = ￿
￿qi
e ) qi
x = ￿
￿P ". It follows that ￿i
x = ri
x ￿ ci
x ￿ ￿
￿P " = 0. Since everything is
symmetric stage 2 equilibrium outputs will be equal, i.e., xi￿ = xj￿ where i 6= j. Using
this and
@qi
x
@et =
@q
j
x
@et = ￿
￿
@P"
@et < 0 ) @xi￿
@et = @xj￿
@et > 0, where i 6= j and t stands for a random
country, i.e., t = 1;2;:::;n Q.E.D.
Stage 2 equilibrium for the linear speci￿cation case with no market power:
Solving simultaneously the system of equations given in (2) and the market clearing
condition for permits given by equation (3) we obtain the equilibrium outputs, net supply
of permits and permits price, as a function of the domestic and foreign total number of
permits issued by the governments:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
x￿ = X￿ =
2(B￿c)+g(e+E)
2(3+g)
e￿ = ￿E￿ = e￿E
2
P "￿ =
2g[(B￿c)￿3(e+E)]
2(3+g)
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
. (A4)
We observe from (A4) that dx￿
de = dX￿
de =
g
2(3+g) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
(a) In the linear speci￿cation with market power, the derivatives of the terms that
represent the market power with respect to P " are equal to zero. Algebraically these
terms are represented by @2E
@P"2 = @2e
@P"2 = 0. Using (10) we illustrate that in equilibrium the
number of issued permits in the case of market power is greater than the corresponding
one in the case of non-market power. Since dX￿￿
de = ￿
g
(2+g)(3+g) < 0 ) the general
strategic e⁄ect is positive. Thus, a force towards laxer regulation is present. Using the
same rationale as in Proposition 3 it follows that Welfare with market power < Welfare
24with no market power Q.E.D.
(b) From part (a) and Proposition 3 it follows that welfare in the cooperative case is
higher than the one in the semi-cooperative case with market power. It remains to show
that the latter is greater than the Nash welfare. For this it is su¢ cient to show that e is
greater in the Nash case.
In order to solve for stage 2 outputs in the Nash case in the absence of tradable permits,
we solve backwards. The initial equations are the same as in the linear speci￿cation case
with the di⁄erence that now we set e = E = 0. Thus, in stage 2 ￿rms have x and X as
choice variables. Solving simultaneously the pro￿t maximizing conditions with respect to
outputs given in (2), we obtain equilibrium outputs in stage 2 as functions of e and E:
x
￿￿￿ =
(B ￿ c)(1 + g) + g(2 + g)e ￿ gE
(1 + g)(3 + g)
and X
￿￿￿ =
(B ￿ c + ￿)(1 + g) + g(2 + g)E ￿ ge
(1 + g)(3 + g)
.
Di⁄erentiating X￿￿￿ with respect to e we have @X￿￿￿
@e = ￿
g
(1+g)(3+g). Yet, @X￿￿￿
@e < @X￿￿
@e )
the general strategic e⁄ect is stronger in the Nash scenario than in the semi-cooperative
) regulation will be laxer in the ￿rst case Q.E.D.
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